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1Abstract
Recent papers on double-blind dictator games have obtained signiﬁ-
cant generous behavior when information regarding recipient is pro-
vided. But the lack of information disincentives other-regarding be-
havior and then, the subject’s behavior closely approximates the game-
theoretic prediction based on the selﬁshness assumption. This paper
conducted four treatment of dictator games. We used one-room de-
sign, between-subjects anonymity and extra-credit point as rewards.
Two treatments were used as baseline whereas the other two were
aimed at reinforcing the recipient powerlessness and positive reci-
procity. To promote these environments we include a “non—neutral”
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2sentence to the instructions. Our baseline and modiﬁed DG are sta-
tistically diﬀerent from each other, indicating that the additional sen-
tences promote other—regarding behaviour. In fact, pure-selﬁsh behav-
ior vanishes. Keywords: dictator game, framing eﬀect, social issues,
fairness, reciprocity. J.E.L. Class.: D63, D64, C91
1 Introduction
The Dictator Game is a decision problem in which a player (the dictator)
decides how to allocate a ﬁx amount of money between another player (the
recipient) and himself. It was considered as a excelent way of analysing hu-
man altruism because any amount of money not kept by the dictator was
incompatible with a purely selﬁsh subject and accordingly it was interpreted
as showing some kind of altruism. The usual ﬁnding was that the dictators
left a positive amount of money to their recipients. However, nowadays the
behaviour of subjects in the Dictator Game is no longer interpreted in such
a naive fashion. It is reckoned that when carrying the Dictator Game (or
any other game) to a laboratory the design of the experiment (including the
instructions given to the experimental subjects) has a great impact on the ob-
3served behaviour. In the literature on Dictator Games, we ﬁnd papers with
neutral instructions and strong mechanisms for anonymity. Among them,
Bolton et al. [3], Hoﬀman et al. [19] and Hoﬀman et al. [18] report devia-
tions from the theoretical prediction in very few cases. On the other extreme
there are papers with non-neutral instructions in the sense that dictators are
informed about some attributes of the recipients: Eckel and Grossman [12]
uses the American Red Cross as recipient, Burham [7] provides dictators with
photos of their recipients, Charness & Gneezy [10] provides dictators with
the names of their recipients and ﬁnally Brañas-Garza [5] informs dictators
about the poverty of their recipients. The eﬀect of this information provision
is to increase considerably the amount of money left to the recipients. In fact,
the percentage of non-zero giving is overwhelming The conclusion is that the
behaviour of subjects in the Dictator Game is greatly inﬂuenced by the fram-
ing of the situation. The idea behind is that the information provided to the
dictators creates a context that motivates other-regarding behaviour. In the
absence of this context, as Eckel and Grossman [12] states “it is not surprising
that the subject’s behavior closely aproximates the game-theoretic prediction
for noncooperative, nonrepeated games with selﬁsh, payoﬀ-maximizing sub-
jects.”In this paper we also aim at promoting a more generous behaviour but
4without any kind of context. Instead of providing the dictators with informa-
tion, we add an aditional sentence to the neutral instructions while keeping
anonymity mechanisms. The purpose of the sentence is to call the subject’s
attention to a particular moral rule rather than creating a context in which
that moral rule applies, as Eckel and Grossman [12] and the other papers
cited above did. In our experiment, we use two diﬀerent sentences which are
intended to capture two “universal” moral rules. The ﬁrst one reads “Note
that your recipient relies on you”.1 This sentence connects with several pa-
pers which focus on the emergence of helping behavior (see Schwartz [20]
and Eagly & Crowley [11]). The second one reads “Note that the recipients
performed the same task before”.2 This sentence engages with recent research
on reciprocity (see Bolton and Zwick [4] and Charness & Rabin [9]). Our
main result is that these sentences promote other-regarding behaviour to a
large extent. In fact, the percentage of zero oﬀers declines from the commonly
observed 50% in a standard Dictator Game to 10%. The rest of the paper is
as follows. Section 2 describes our experiment. The results and its discussion
are done in Sections 3 and 4. Finally Section 5 concludes.
1The spanish wording was “Recuerda él está en tus manos”.
2The spanish wording was “Recuerda él tomó la misma decisión anteriormente”.
52 Experimental Design and Procedures
We conduct four versions of the Dictator Game (DG hereafter). These trea-
ments were performed at the same time within only one room, although in
two steps. Following Frohlich et al. [15] (Maryland one room treatment) we
placed in the same room dictators and recipients, hence all individuals could
see each other. Step 1: Treatments 1 & 2 were conducted at the same time:
40 dictators and 40 recipients.
1. Treatment 1,T 1( Baseline I) :As t a n d a r dD Gw i t h2 0d i c t a t o r sa n d
20 recipients. Dictators were given their instructions and recipients
were kept ignorant of what was going on. The instructions read:
“A ﬁx e da m o u n to f1 0e x p e r i m e n t a lu n i t sh a sb e e np r o v i s i o n -
ally allocated for you and your recipient. These 10 units are
e q u a lt o0 , 5e x t r ap o i n t si nt h eﬁnal grade of Intermediate Mi-
croeconomics. Your task is to decide how to divide this amount
of points between your recipient and yourself. Any division (even
keeping all for yourself) is allowed. Your partner will be ran-
domly selected from those 20 subjects placed in the row of your
left. Thank you for your participation”..3
3The above text came after the following initial paragraph: Welcome to this experiment
62. Treatment 2,T 2( Moral Framing I: Helping others): A modiﬁed DG
with 20 dictators and 20 recipients. Dictators received identical instruc-
tions to treatment T1, except one aditional (non-neutral) sentence at
the end. This sentence was “Note that your recipient relies on you”.
Step 2: In this step, we switched roles among participants of the exper-
iment, i.e. the forty (20+20) subjects who remained ignorant in treatments
T1 and T2 (those subjects who without their knowledge acted as recipients)
became dictators in treatments 3 & 4. Also, the former dictators acted as
recipients in these new treatments.
3. Treatment 3,T 3( Baseline II: Order eﬀect) :As t a n d a r dD Gw i t h2 0
dictators (recipients in Step 1) and 20 recipients (dictators in Step 1).
The diﬀerence between this treatment and T1 is that dictators could
infere their participacion as recipients in treatment T1.
4. Treatment 4,T 4( Moral Framing II. Reciprocity): A modiﬁed DG
with 20 dictators (recipients in Step 1) and 20 recipients (dictators in
Step 1). Dictators received identical instructions than T3’s with an
on decision making, etc. The between-subjects anonymity was completely guaranteed.
Original instructions were written in Spanish.
7aditional (non-neutral) sentence at the bottom. This sentence was:
“Note that the recipients performed the same task before”.
The experimental sessions were carried out during March 2004 at the Uni-
versity of Jaén, Spain. The total population sample amounted to 80 students.
These students were volunteers from two groups enrolled in the subject "In-
termediate Microeconomic".4 They belong to the second semester of the ﬁrst
year in the Bussines degree, what implies that they had no training in Game
Theory. Students were recruited by an open invitation to participate in a
voluntary exam. Eighty one students came to the voluntary exam the day of
the experiment. Given that our design required the number of subjects to be
multiple of four, one of the subjects was randomly selected to act as monitor,
earning 0,25 point as show-up fee. The remaining 80 subjects participated
in the experiment. Once students were randomly placed in four columns
containing 20 individuals each, the experiments were conducted according to
the next sequence:
First: Column 1 subjects (left side) played treatment T1 at the same time
than column 3 individuals played treatment T2.
4The ﬁrst author teaches this subject at that University.
8Second: After these subjects had ﬁnished their assigments and without any
feedback, column 2 students played treatment T3 and column 4 indi-
viduals (right side) played treatment T4.
3 The Analysis of the Moral Framings
Table 1 displays dictators’ givings in our four treatments. Recall that treat-
ments T1 and T3 were baseline treatments whereas treatments T2 and T4
were our modiﬁed treatments. We ﬁrst analyse the success of our moral
framing in promoting more generous behaviour by comparing our modiﬁed
treatments with their associated baseline treatments.
Moral Framing I
Recall that the added sentence is: Your recipient relies on you (in Spanish
“is placed in your hands”). Our motivation here is that by making the dicta-
tors become aware of the powerlessness of their recipients, they will respond
by displaying a more generous behaviour. Well, the Mann-Whitney (χ2 =
−3,42;p =0 ,00) and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (χ2 =1 ,73;p =0 ,00)
reject the null, thus T1 and T2 are not drawn from the same population. This
9means that the additional sentence has an eﬀect on the subjects behaviour.
By looking at the following picture 1a, where the cumulative frequencies for
these two treatments are plotted, we see that the donations in T2 ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominates the donations of the baseline treatment. Hence, the



















(a) T1 vs. T2 (b) T3 vs. T4
Figure 1: Treatment Effects
An statistical analysis of the donations as given in Table 1 shows that the
use of the additional sentence (i) increases the average contribution from 12%
to 31% of the endowment and (ii) the number of subjects leaving nothing falls
from 55% (11 subjects) to 10%. We now explore our second moral framing.
10Dictators Treatments5
Givings T1 T2 T3 T4
0 1 121 0 1
11 0 0 5
24 3 0 2
32 7 4 2
41 5 2 1
51 3 4 8
≥60 0 0 1
N2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0
Mean 1,2 3,1 2 3,25
Median 0 3 1,5 3,5
Mode 0 3 0 5
St. Dev. 1,57 1,41 2,15 1,94
Table 1: Donations by Treatments
5The modal value in each treatment is in bold.
11Moral Framing II
Our second sentence is: Note that the recipients performed the same
task before. Our motivation here was to promote reciprocity feelings. Well,
the Mann-Whitney (χ2 = −2,16;p =0 ,03) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
(χ2 =1 ,42;p =0 ,03) reject the null, thus T3 and T4 are not drawn from
the same population. This means that this second sentence also has en eﬀect
on subjects behaviour. By looking at ﬁgure 1b,6 which plots the cumulative
frequency of donations for these two treatments, we see that the donations in
T4 ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the donations in its beaseline. Hence,
again the additional sentence promotes a more generous behaviour. The
most striking features of the donations data are that the use of the addi-
tional sentence (i) increases the average contribution from 20% to 32,5% of
the endowment and (ii) the number of subjects leaving nothing falls from 10
to 1.
Helping behavior vs Reciprocity
6To simplify the only individual giving 6C = (T4) has been included within the group of
subjects giving 5C =.
12We ﬁnally compare the eﬀects of the two sentences to each other to see
whether there are some diﬀerences, i.e. whether subjects had diﬀerent re-
actions to these sentences. Next ﬁgure 2a plots the cumulative frequencies
for our two modiﬁed treatments. Note that in this case, neither treatment
stochastically dominates the other.7 To understand what is happening, let us
focus on ﬁgure 2b, which plots the donations in these two treatments. Note






















(a) Cumulative frequencies (b) Relative frequencies
Figure 2: Helping vs. Reciprocate [T2 and T4]
7Not even a second order stochastic dominance is obtained.
13From this ﬁgure, it appears a clear diﬀerence in the shapes of the givings,
what indicates that the eﬀect of the additional sentence is diﬀerent across
treatments: Whereas the helping—others treatment (T2) has an inverted U-
shape, the reciprocate treatment (T4) displays a U-shape.
• The reciprocate treatment promotes extreme forms of behaviour: 13
subjects (77%) donated either the min or the half. Interestingly the
majority of the subjects (8) reacted to the sentence by displaying an
equal-division behaviour.
Recall that our sentence gave not any information about how the recipient
h a dp e r f o r m e dt h es a m et a s kb e f o r e . Those subjects who believed that their
recipient had been generous positively reciprocate to them (8); other dicta-
tors who believed in selﬁsh recipients punished them (5). In this sense, the
reciprocity depends on beliefs. Overall, the equal-division eﬀect is greater
than the selﬁsh reaction, what causes the reciprocate treatment to be statis-
tically diﬀerent from its baseline treatment.
• On the other hand, the helping—others sentence does not provoke po-
larised reactions, but promotes other—regarding behaviour in a more
uniform way, the modal donation being 3.
14Our conclusion is therefore that the helping—other sentence has a one-way
eﬀect whereas the reciprocate sentence has a two-way eﬀect. However, both
of them, as analysed before, helps to promote more generous behaviour with
respect to the baseline treatments.
4F u r t h e r A n a l y s i s
We need to perform a ﬁnal analysis for the conclusions reached in the previous
section to be placed in the literature. The reason is that our DG experiment
has several diﬀerences with respect to the regular procedure followed in the
papers cited in the Introduction. These diﬀerences are:
1. The use of extra-points instead of money as the reward mechanism.
We chose this reward mechanism not only because it is cheaper but
because our feeling was that extra-points have a greater motivational
power in students.
2. One single room vs. two rooms (A: dictators; B: recipients). Recall
that students were called to a voluntary exam.
3. Between-subject anonymity (vs. doubled-blind). We needed to identify
participants to properly add the extra-points to their ﬁnal grades. This
15was done by asking their university identiﬁcation numbers.
So for our results to be comparable with those found in the literature
on DG, we need to show that our baseline data are comparable to the data
reported in standard DG experiments. We do so in two steps. First, we
show that the data of our two baseline treatments are drawn from the same
population. Second, we use data from Hoﬀman et al. [18] (HMSS) and Frolich
et al. [15] (FOM.) for comparison purposes. As a ﬁrst step, and given that T1
dictators played their game in the ﬁrst step and T3 dictators did the same
task in the second step, we check whether there is any diﬀerence between
them. This might be because dictators in T3 could ﬁgure out that they
acted as recipients of T1 dictators, implying that some kind of reciprocity
could operate. Fortunatelly, the Mann-Whitney (χ2 = −1,11;p =0 ,31)a n d
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (χ2 =0 ,94;p =0 ,32) for unpaired samples
do not reject the null of equal distribution. The conclusion is that T1 &
T3 samples are drawn from the same population. This analysis allows us
to merge T1 and T3 samples. We will name standard dictator game (SDG)
to those data arising from T1 and T3. Second, we compare our SDG data
t ot h o s er e p o r t e di nH M S Sa n di nF O M .W ep e r f o r mt h r e ec h a n g e sw i t h
respect to HMSS: points (vs. money) + one room (vs. 2 separated rooms)
16+ single anonymity (vs. double blind). With respecto to the FOM design,
there appear two diﬀerences: points (vs. money) + single anonymity (vs.
double blind). The statistical analysis follows:
• SDG vs HMSS: The Mann-Whitney (χ2 = −1,57;p =0 ,11)a n dt h e
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (χ2 =1 ,23;p =0 ,09) for unpaired samples
do not reject the null of equal distribution. Also, the Kruskal-Wallis
test (χ2 =3 ,32;p =0 ,19)f o rk =3unpaired samples (T1, T3 and
HMSS) does not reject the null of equal distribution. Hence HMSS and
SDG observations are drawn from the same population.
• SDG vs FOM: The Mann-Whitney (χ2 = −1,46;p =0 ,14)a n dt h e
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests (χ2 =0 ,99;p =0 ,28) for unpaired samples
do not reject the null; also, the Kruskal-Wallis test (χ2 =3 ,15;p =
0,20)f o rk =3unpaired samples (T1, T3 and FOM) does not reject
the null, hence FOM & SDG data are drawn from the same population.
Next ﬁgure illustrates SGD, HMS and FOM donations cumulative fre-
quency. As Figure 3 shows, the SDG cumulative frequency is between HMSS
and FOM frequencies.8 Hence, our baseline data are in line with those arising
8We observe that HMSS ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates SDG and SDG ﬁrst order
stochastically dominates FOM.
17from standard DG experiments, what validates our conclusions on the use of




















Figure 3: Donations in HMSS, FOM & SDG
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The traditional way of promoting other-regarding behaviour in DG is to cre-
ate a context in which fairness and altruism appear as natural responses
(see Eckel & Grossman [12]). This paper has replaced the context by a sen-
tence, i.e. we add a sentence to the neutral instructions used in standards
DG experiments. The aim of the sentence is to drive subjects attention to
a particular social or moral rule. Hence, in our paper, rather than creating
18the context in which a particular social or moral rule applies, we induce sub-
jects to use a particular rule. We use two diﬀerent sentences: (i) “Note that
your recipient relies on you” . T h ei d e ah e r ei st h a tb ym a k i n gt h ed i c t a -
tors become aware of the powerlessness of their recipients, they will respond
by displaying a more generous behaviour; and (ii) “Note that the recipients
performed the same task before”. The motivation here was to induce reci-
procity feelings. Our results show that the above sentences are successful at
increasing the dictators donations. In fact, pure selﬁsh behaviour which is so
commonly observed in DG with neutral instructions and strong mechanisms
for anonymity vanishes in our experiment.
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